Las fuentes del escepticismo

Duncan Pritchard, Vicente Raga Rosaleny

Resumen


Se afirma que el problema del escepticismo radical, en el que se centra gran parte de la discusión epistemológica contemporánea, se divide en dos formulaciones lógicamente distintas: una basada en el principio de clausura, y otra en el principio de infradeterminación. Primero, vamos a exponer la propuesta de Wittgenstein acerca de la estructura de la evaluación racional, y mostraremos cómo puede tratar con el escepticismo radical basado en el principio de clausura, al menos cuando dicha explicación se formula adecuadamente. Sin embargo, también aseveramos que esta propuesta no logra dar cuenta del escepticismo radical basado en la infradeterminación. El antídoto para esta última forma de escepticismo radical se encuentra en otra parte, sugerimos que en el seno del disyuntivismo epistémico.


Palabras clave


creencia; clausura; disyuntivismo epistémico; compromisos-gozne; conocimiento; percepción; escepticismo; infradeterminación; Wittgenstein

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Referencias


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.17533/10.17533/udea.ef.n60a12 Resumen : 173 PDF : 163 HTML : 2

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