Argumentos de contraste fenoménico a favor de la fenomenología cognitiva

Elijah Chudnoff, Elizabeth Cardona Muñoz, Juan Fernando Álvarez Céspedes

Resumen


De acuerdo con quienes proponen que la fenomenología cognitiva es irreductible, algunos estados cognitivos ocasionan estados fenoménicos en el sujeto para los que no son condición suficiente los estados totalmente sensoriales. Uno de los enfoques principales para defender el punto de vista de que hay fenomenología cognitiva irreductible consiste en ofrecer un argumento de contraste fenoménico. En este artículo distingo tres tipos de argumentos de contraste fenoménico: el que llamo puro ―representado por el argumento Jack/Jacques de Strawson―, el hipotético ―representado por el argumento de Zoe de Kriegel― y el glosado ―desarrollado por primera vez aquí. Afirmo que los argumentos de contraste fenoménico puro e hipotético enfrentan dificultades significativas, pero hay un argumento sólido de contraste glosado a favor de la fenomenología cognitiva irreductible.


Palabras clave


Cognición, fenomenología, contraste fenoménico, Strawson, Kriegel

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Referencias


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DOI: https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n57a09 Resumen : 716 PDF : 494 HTML : 4

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